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NATURE OF CASE
This is an action to recover a money judgment for the value
; an aircraft damaged in an emergency landing near the Salt Lake

:;ty Airport.

The plaintiffs, Donald A. Dyson, Stephen F. Kesler,

T. Bissell, Ronald McClain, Donald L. Oborn, Elmo Walker and

:ary Ferguson (Owners) sued the defendant pilot, Kenneth R. Shannon
::,annon) on the grounds of negligence and defendants Aviation
::ice of America, Incorporated (AOA) the general insurance agency
,:.d Ranger Insurance Company (Ranger), the hull liability carrier,

:. the grormds that AOA and Ranger failed to acknowledge insurance
:•;erage placed by the Dysons, their ostensible agent.
'mger then filed a Third-Party Complaint

ag~inst

AOA and

Dysons alleging

::at if AOA and Ranger \vere liable to the Owners, Dysons were
~able

to them for negligence and breach of duty as local agents

:c AOA and Ranger.
The Owners also filed an action directly against the Dysons
.. :eging that the Dysons agreed to secure coverage rmder the policy
:. question while the aircraft: was being piloted by Shannon, but
ded to do so.

The Dysons t:hen filed a Cormterclaim against AOA

:d Ranger in the latter's third-party action alleging that if

·sons '>Jere held liable to the Owners, AOA and Ranger were liable
:them for not endorsing Shannon as a covered pilot on the policy
·question as Dysons had requested.
DISPOSITION

I~

LOI·iER COURT

The trial court entered judgment in favor of AOA and Ranger
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Complaint,
but entered judgment in favor of Owners and
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-~ers'
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against Dysons on Owners' Cross-Claim and Third-Party Complaint
against Dysons.

The trial court further entered judgment in favor

of AOA and Ranger and against Dysons on Dysons' Counterclaim agains:
AOA and Ranger.

Prior to trial, the trial court on motion of the other part:e
but without hearing, struck Dysons' demand for jury trial as being
untimely.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Plaintiff Donald A. Dyson, as one of the Owners, seeks rever:
of the trial court's judgment in favor of AOA and Ranger on plaintiffs' Complaint; and Donald A. Dyson and L. F. Dyson & Associates,
as third-party defendants and counterclaimants, seek reversal of
the trial court's judgment against them in favor of AOA and Ranger
on Dysons' Counterclaim and pray that the trial court be directed
to enter judgment in favor of Dysons against AOA and Ranger in tte
sum of any judgment entered in favor of the plaintiffs against thee
Alternatively, Dysons seek remand of the case to the trial
court for trial by jury pursuant to Dysons' demand therefor.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about March 18, 1975, the five original O'..mers, plai:c·
tiffs herein, purchased a 1968 Cessna aircraft which was financed~~
Walker Bank & Trust Company (Ex. 36).

On March 21, 1975, Donald

A. Dyson, one of the original Owners -,.,ho was also an J.nsurance age:1:

-2-
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;JJlitted an Application For Aircraft Insurance to AOA (Ex. 4).
E is an underwriting group which specializes in writing aviation
:csurance for approximately 65 insurance companies that offer avia-

·:on coverages (R. 568).

The application indicated that the insured

;,;as to be Donald A. Dyson and that Donald A. Dyson and Jim Breeze,
::.FAA instructor, were to be the named pilots, with "Additional

::ots to be added as they qualify" (Ex. 4).
:~Ranger

and policy

.:s·Jed effective as of

~o.

AOA placed the coverage

AC Al-198882 dated April 1, 1975 was

~!arch

26, 1975 for a one-year period (Ex. 3)

!I
.::a total premium of $7C.8. ClO (Ex.

5).

All of the original 0wners except

~1cClain

were present a':

·.e time financing T.Vas arranged at \.Jalker Bank and understood that

·son would secure insurance on the aircraft in the amount of their
··:estment, $27,000.00 (R.

356, 362-363, 383).

At the time of the application in question, AOA operated
·:ough a loca:!. general agency at Cody, I.Jyoming known as Aviation
o:.eral Agency (AGA) to make their market more attractive to insur·:e agencies in this area (R.

573).

:1rs

Cartwright, the underwriter

:handled the policy in question at the Dyson agencv submitted
; application for coverage on the aircraf: in ques':ion to AOA
:o:.1gh AGA and dealt with AGA for some time thereafter on matters
'-a::ing to the polic:1 (R. C.79).

Prior to the accident in question,

'started dealing directly with AOA as she had done prior to the
:ablisnment of

,lJ";A
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The Dyson agency had been writing aviation coverage throug:
AOA with Ranger since approximately February 14, 1968 when an
Agency Agreement was executed between AOA/Ranger and Dyson (Ex. 2)
This agreement provides, inter alia, that:
Nothing herein shall be construed as authorizing
the Agent to commit or bind the Company to any
liability without prior approval of Aviation
Office of America, Inc.
The agency agreement was not modified in writing prior to the date
of the loss in question (R. 385).

Donald Dyson contended that by

practice and usage, this limitation was modified about October 19;j
(R. 507-511) when AOA/Ranger began to put into effect their memo
requests, effective as of the date of the request.
The office procedure followed by AOA in handling a mailedin application to add a pilot to an existing policy is that the
application is received and opened in the mail room and then distributed to the underwriting department (R. 570); an undePNTiter
will then review it and initial it for approval and route it to
the policy writing department (R. 680) where the endorsement is
typed in final form.

Since the underwriter does not note a date

when he initials the application as approved, the typist, in the
absence of other instruction, will type the endorsement effective
as of the date of the application requesting it. (R. 680).
Mr. Tom Dougherty, a Senior Vice-President at AOA. is in
charge of the underwriting department (K. 568).

Prior to trial. ~e

reviewed AOA' s filed regarding the Dyson agency ('Z

6 33).

He
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.:~nowledged
:2nrtment

,;.:~sting

that it was the practice of the AOA underwriting

'-'hen writing an endorsement to add a pilot to an

policy to make the endorsement effective as of the date

:the application requesting the endorsement, if no other date
~

requested in the application and if the application contained

:J information necessary to rate the risk (R. 612).

In every

5tance this would result in back-dating the effective date of
:.·.e endorsement because the endorsement would always be typed in
.:•A's office at a date later than the application requesting it
;s ty?ed in the agent's office (R. 612).

Depending on the amount

:activity going on with respect to a particular policy, such
;c~-dating

may amount to as much as a couple of months (R. 615).

Although Mr. Dougherty was reluctant to 2dmit that there
;:e no exceptions to the aforementioned practice, after review of
:.; files regarding transactions with the Dyson agency, he was
:.a':Jle to cite any instances to the contrary (R. 611, 672-675).
In those instances where the initial application did not
:"'ain all necessary

infor.:~ation

to rate the risk, the endorsement

:·::d be back-dated from the issue date in AOA' s office to the date
·en the additional information was sent to AOA from the agent's
::ce (R. 670).

The only instance '-"hich l'!r. Dougherty could find

·a review of AOA files regarding the Dyson agencv where AOA had not

.:eoted a risk as requested by Dyson was a situation where coverage
~~een reque5ted for an ~nsured in the business of repairing and

:::.lding damaged aircraft •..;ho wanted coverage •.,;hile transporting
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and Technology
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The history of activity on the policy in question in adding
pilots atter the initial writing is substantially as follows:
Re:

STEPHEN KESLER.

Mrs. Mary Cartwright of the Dyson

agency requested his addition by telephone call and follow-up memo
of July 21, 1975 to Dave Brannon at AGA (Ex. 8).

Mr. Brannon by

telephone call and memo of July 21, 1975 to underwriter Tom Dougherty
at AOA requested coverage effective July 22, 1975 (Ex. 7).

On

August 20, 1975, AOA sent a memo to Dysons requesting certain pilot
experience information (Ex. 9).

The requested information was sent

to AOA, date uncertain, but prior to September 17, 1975 when AOA
advised Dysons by memo (Ex. 10) that an endorsement adding Kesler
was being typed that date.

The endorsement was issued September

17, 1975, effective as of July 22, 1975 (Ex. 11).
Re:

TIM BISSELL.

Mrs. Cartwright requested his addition

by memo to Mr. Brannon at AGA on August 26, 1975 (Ex. 6).

On

September 17, 1975, AOA sent a memo (Ex. 10) requesting advice as
to Bissell 1 s first name [although it was noted on Hrs. Cartwright's
memo to AGA].

On

September 24, 1975, Sara Broughton, assistant

underwriter at AOA (R. 575)

1

penned a reply note requesting pilot

experience forms (see Exhibit 12) to Mrs. Cartwright's memo of
August 26, 1975, which she had sent to AGA, who apparently forwardec
the same to AOA.

By memo of November l3, 1975 (Ex. 26), the pilot

experience form for Bissell (Ex. 13) '.-las sent to AOA by Mrs. Cart·,,r:;
AOA issued the endorsement adding Bissell on December 2, 1975, effec~ive as of Novebmer 13, 1975 (Ex.

14)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Re:

GARY FERGUSON.

On December 4, 1975, Mrs. Cartwright

:nt a memo with pilot experience form attached
:J

l·!r. Dougherty at AOA.

(Ex. 15) directly

At that time, Mrs. Cartwright had been

';mished a supply of Pilot Experience Forms (R. 439) [per her
::quest to AOA of November 5, 1975 (Ex. 20)].

Without further

:Jmmunication, AOA issued the endorsement (Ex. 16) adding Ferguson
.:. December 10, 1975, effective as of December 4, 1975.
Re:
=~t

KE~ETH

SHAllliON.

On December 8, 1975, Mrs. Cartwright

a memo with pilot experience form attached (Ex. 17) directly

:Tom Dougherty at AOA.

The records of Dyson reflect no response

::his request prior to February 1, 1976 when the aircraft crashed
·.:le being operated by Kenneth Shannon (R. 441).

Mrs. Cartwright

·::alls two telephone conYersations with Mr. Dougherty at AOA
:;arding other policies [Reynolds and Rich] prior to the accident
:en she mentioned that they were still waiting on Shannon's endorse-

::ct (R. 442).

In both instances, she recalls Mr. Dougherty saying

:would check on it and get it out.

No mention was made of Shannon

::being acceptable as a pilot (R. 442).

Mr. Dougherty has no

::ollection of the telephone calls (R. 598).

His files do reflect

'~ephone calls with respect to these individuals.

Both Mrs. Cartwright

·.: :·lr. Dougherty agree that there was a telephone call regarding
·eRich policy on December 16, 1975 (R. 6 35) . but Mr. Dougherty
;~

:ctends that the telephone call regarding Reynolds occurred after
~accident

·:~ese

in question (R. 635).

Mr. Dougherty's telephone notes

calls in the particular files do not reflect an inquiry
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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regarding the Shannon endorsement and he has no independent recollection whether or not the Shannon request was mentioned (R. 599).
Upon being advised of the accident, Hrs. Cartwright reportec
the same to AOA by telephone WATTS line (R. 422) and confirmed with
a First Notice of Claim dated February 2, 1976 (Ex. 18).
On February 15, 1976, Mrs. Cartwright sent a follow-up memo
(Ex. 19) regarding the memo of December 8, 1976 requesting the
endorsement of Shannon and mentioned that Dyson had sold his interes:
in the aircraft to Shannon.

On March l, 1976 Mr. Dougherty had a telephone conversation
with Mr. Tom Lehman,

an AOA claims examiner (R. 60 3) .

Mr. Dougher:::

made notes of the conversation (Ex. 31), which he interpreted in
the record as follows:
Has heard from agent. Been selling interest in
aircraft, but did not add as insureds at time of
loss. Insured had no insurable interest. To deny
loss. Answer memo, did not add pilot because no
reply to Sara B. 12/15 memo.

On that same date, March l, 1976, Mr. Dougherty replied to

~trs.

Cartwright's memo of February 15, 1976 as follows:
l. Please note that we quoted the amount of
premium required to add pilot, but did not
receive a response.
2. It is not customary to assign policies,
and you would need approval of the company
in advance.
Because of open claim, have passed this information to claims, ref. #17046.
(Ex. 30).
On March 3, 1976, Mr. Dougherty received a telephone call
from Mary Cartwright responding to Mr. Dougherty's memo o!' >'arch l.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Hr. Dougherty's notes (Ex. 32) indicate that Mrs. Cartwright

:civised him that she had not received Sara Broughton 1 s memo of
:ecember 15, 1975, that Mr. Dyson had not completed transfer of

-.:s

interest in the plane to Shannon as yet and that she wanted

.Jknow the status of the endorsement and whether or not the claim
Js affected.

:eh.Qan

and

The note then indicates he would check with Torn

the bottom portion of the note reads as follows:
Torn Lehl:lan digging in r..;ith atto!l1ev-------To
be denied.
Hill have written insured in a week-do not co=it. (R. 607).
~ecernber

The
.)ove, which

~1rs.

15, 1975 meQO of Sara Broughton referred to

Cartwright stated she had not received and ,.;1---:.c:!:

:uld not be found in Dysons

1

policy file, was appended to l1rs.

1

·artwright s memo of December 8, 1975 requesting the endorsement
:Shannon.

The message portion of Mrs. Cartwrig~t's memo reads

; follows:
We enclose a pilot experience form completed by
Kenneth Richard Shannon who is to be included as
a pilot under the above captioned policy. We
would appreciate your endorsement to this effect.
Thanks.
(Signed

~1ary)

--.e hand r,.;ritten memo of Sara Broughton as it appea:::-s on AOA's file

:?y reads as follows:

This risk has reached a flying club exposure.
To
add this pilot it will be a fullv earned premium
of $100.00.
Please advise if yo~ want him added.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Sara Broughton, by deposition,

test~ied

she is an under-

writer at AOA (R. 732) and that she wrote the bottom portion of
what is now Exhibit 34 and "mailed it back to the agent" (R. 739-740)
Mail generated by the underwriting department is turned over to
the mail room people.

According to Mr. Dougherty, Sara Broughton

would not be an individual who would actually put mail in a U.S.
Mail receptacle (R. 609) .
The case was originally set for trial on September 19, 1977,
and on September 14 counsel for appellants served by delivery a

de~nd

for jury trial on the other parties and filed the same on September
15 (R. 201-202).

On September 15 and 16, counsel for the other

parties filed and served variously denominated documents, objecting
to appellant 1 s demand for jury trial.

On September 16 the Court ruled

on said objections, without hearing, and advised counsel that appellant
demand for jury trial was denied.
ARGUMENT
Appellants Dyson recognize that on appeal any disputed facts
upon which conflicting evidence was received must be construed in
favor of the trial court 1 s findings and judgment.

However, appellants

contend that the trial court erred in assessing the legal effect
of the testimony of AOA 1 s witnesses on cross-examination, and that
pursuant to such undisputed testimony, appellants are entitled to
judgment over against respondents AOA/Ra!lgcr ::..:-. ::::e :::a:-.n 2 :- oi: ?l;;:!.ntiffs' judgment against Dysons.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT I
THE PRACTICE OF A..'l I:~SURANCE COHPANY
IN BACK-DATI:1G ENDORSEMENTS FOR
COVERAGE TO THE DATE OF ru'l AGENT'S
REQ1'EST AHOUNTS TO EXTEiiDING BINDING
AUTHORITY TO THE AGENT.
As an abstract principle, respondents do not seriously
~tend

the proposition that if an insurance company adopts the

:actice of back-dating endorsements for additional insurance coverage
l ~e

dates that the soliciting agent requested the coverages, that

,d ::e company has in fact impliedly extended binding authority to the
~nt.

Rather, respondents deny that they adopted such a practice.
The rational for the foregoing proposition is discusoed in

::ail in Lewis v. Travelers Insurance Companv, 239 A. 2d 4 (New Jersey

!d .'68).

In that case, the agent admittedly gave an oral binder to

mt··.e insured for fire coverage of certain ?Yer.ises ccn August 27.
:e company contended that it had rejected the application on

:Jtember 4.

The insured suffered a fire less on September 5.

·.e col!lpany' s letter of rejection reached the agent on September 6.

:e company declined coverage and denied that the agent had binding

:s ::horitv.
•

The insured sued both the agent and the company.

Although there was a substantial dispute as to whether or
:the company [Travelers] had ever expressl:; authorized the agent
:bind it in the area of inland ~arine coverages, the Supreme Court
::lew Jersey specified in its opinion. "\,je accept the premise that
~velers never

in so ~anv words authorized the agents to bind a

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding
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risk in that category."

The Court then explained that the case

turns upon the admitted fact that the company had accepted some
300 inland marine risks submitted by the agents over a period of
years and in each case had back-dated the policy as of the date
requested on the application for whatever coverage was sought as
of that time.
Travelers took the position that back-dating is a uniform
practice in the industry and does not bespeak authority in the agent
to issue a binder, but means only that if Travelers should decide
to accept the application, coverage will attach retroactively to
the date requested in the application.

With respect to such

explanation, the Court stated:
Under tha.t view, the applicant would hold the
interim risk if Travelers should reject the application after a loss, while Travelers, if it issued
the policy, would obtain a full premium for the
period during which it held the option to accept
or reject the application even though at the
time of acceptance Travelers knew there had been
no loss and of course no risk .
. . . The unfairness of an undisclosed option in
the company is evident.
[Authority cited].
Equally
obvious is the room for overreaching either by an
ag~nt eager to get the business or by a company
wh~7h learns of a loss before acting on the applicat~on.

The Court then held with respect to the insured's claim against
Travelers as follows:
For these reasons the cases hold that a practice
., t..acl- ~ ~·
t',.
'
0.~
~
~-ua~~n~ .•& po~Lcy to tne date requested

~n the appllcatlo~ spells ~ut 2~thc~i~y in the
age~t to give a binder for interim coverage pending
act~on upon the application [Authorities cited].

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-12-

In that case, Travelers had not appealed from the trial
;::t' s judgment in favor of the insured against it, but only of
-_ 2

:rial court's refusal to permit indemnification over against

-2

agent.

·;::t

With respect to the company v. agent dispute, the

noted:
The cases just cited deal with a controversy between the applicant and the carrier. As we noted
earlier, Travelers did not appeal from the judgment
the applicant obtained against it. The question is
whether those cases are also meaningful when the
carrier turns to the agent for indemnification.
I.Je think they are, for although it was unnecessary
in those cases to decide whether the carrier was
liable because the agent's aut:writy -...,as merely
"apparent" rather than implied in fact and there·
fore actual, nonetheless, ultimate basis for those
cases would equally support a finding of authority
as between the agent and the principal. We say
this beca~se the theme was not that the fact of
agency itself necessarily excluded aPparent authority
to bind the risk, but rather that i~ was the cornan?' s Practice of back-datin '"'hi.;:\ i::mcrted the
existence ot aut oritv to in . It sue con uct on
the part of the principal could reasonable lead the
agent too to believe he has authoritv to bind the
risk, then the principal should be e~ually chargeable with the i~olication of its conduct in a
controversy with. the agent.

In short, an agent is in fact authori=ed to do
",...,hat" it is reasonable for hi:n to infer that the
principal desires him to do in light of the principal's manifestations and the facts as he knows or
should knm.J t::Ce~ :1t the time he acts,'' Restateoent
(Second) of Agenc:: (1955), §33. p. 115; and '..;ith
exceptions not here relevant, ":1uthority to do an
act can be created bv ~citten or spoken words or
other conduct of the. orincio:1l whi~h. reasonably
interoreteo, c:1using the agent to believe that the
principal desires h~m so
act on :he principal's
accot.:nt," Rest:lte"!ent (Second) of Agencv (1958),
§26,
100. AnJ if the authori=ation is ambiguous,
the a ent '1:1s J c",orit" to :let in a.ccordance with

to

~.v h

t
e :- ~ 2 3 ,_: n c.l : ·: b 12 : -_:__ t.: ~: e s : '--' ::, e ~<1 e ~,..; i
tJ:- nc p.J l e'.ren
~(-,~::::~~ i : -:._s c2n:::ra;:·.r ::'-'

h o f t !1 e
he princioal' s
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The Court then discussed the practical business purposes for
the back-dating practice between company and agent as tollm-Js:
Curran [Agent] testified that he was lead by the
practice of back-dating to believe that he was
authorized to bind the risk while Travelers considered the application. We see no reason to doubt
the truthfulness of that testimony or the reasonableness of that belief. As we have already said,
it would be unreasonable to expect an applicant for
insurance to give any one company an option, indefinite as to time, to decide whether to sell coverage
retroactively with the applicant holding an interim
risk. The practice of back-dating the policy which
would lead the applicant to believe the agent is
authorized to bind the risk, if no more were show~,
lead an agent to the same estimate of his authority.
That conclusion is so strongly required that an insurer
could escape it only through the plainest instructions to the agent to tell an applicant for immediate
coverage in so many words (1) that the interim loss
will fall upon the applicant if the application is
rejected by the company; (2) the period of time "'ithin
which the company will act on the application; (3) the
objective standard upon which the company will weight
the application, or the absence of such a standard;
and (4) that a premium will be charged at the full
rate for the period of retroactive coverage if the
policy should issue. He doubt that a company which
so instructed its a ents would remain com etitive.
We o not suggest that sue instructions wou
bar
the applicant if the agent failed to abide by them.
Rather the point is that a principal, who as in this
case, wants to shift the interim insurance risk to the
agent because he failed to inform the applicant would
have,t? a~ert the,agent to that consequence bv such
expl~c~t ~nstruct~ons.
(Emphasis added).
The Court then went on to hold with respect to the company v. agent
dispute:
We prefer to hold that a practice of back-dating
policies to the date requested in the application
~mplies, as between principal and agent, authority
~n ~h~ agent to bind a risk pending the principal's
dec~s~on on the application.
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Lastly,

~ith

;e instant case,
::::~pany

respect to Travelers contention, as AOA's in

that the written agency agreement between <.:he

and agent barred a grant of authority other than by writing,

:'.e Court stated:

The foregoing case is in accord with the law of several

:her jurisdictions regarding the practice of back-dating as stated
:Couch on Insurance 2d, Section 26:198 which reads as follows:
There is authority that an agent, empowered to
bi~d the co~any by contracts of insurance, has
authority to bind it by a preliminary or temporary
contract of insurance.
Authoritv to enter into
contracts o:' interim insurance ma;'T be implied from
the custom of the insurer of datin
olicies as of
t e ate ot t. e aop lcation,
or in such case t e
agent taking the application has implied or apparent
authority to make a valid preliminary contract of
insurance, e:'fective from the making of the application until its acceptance or rejection, although
the application provides that the company shall
not be bound bv anv act done or statement made bv
any agent, not-authorized by or contained in the.
application, and not~ithstanding the application also
recites that it is subject to the approval of the
company, othenvise in the case of loss subse uent
~o ~he ao~lication an
orior to its acceptance or
re'ection the i~s~re~ ~Jould ~ot be cove~ed, whereas
i
loss ha not occurre
urin~ s~ch a perio . he
would. in case ot acceotance ot the risk. have had
to oav a :Jre:ni·JJTI covering it.
(Emphasis added).
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However, Lewis v. Travelers Insurance Company, supra, is

particula~b

significant in the instant dispute since it also deals with the
question of indemnity between agent and company.
As the New Jersey Supreme Court pointed out in Lewis v.
Travelers, supra, an insurance company could not remain competitive
if it required its agents to give the type if instructions necessary
to avoid the legal consequences of back-dating policies and endorsements.

Mr. Dougherty, AOA's Senior Vice-President in charge of

underwriting, acknowledged in his testimony that an insurance agent
must be able to promptly meet the needs of his insurance clients and
that if an insurance company did not allow its agents to supply that

kind of service, the agents would be looking for other companies 1-1it:
which to write their insurance (R. 572-573).

This is obviously the

reason AOA/Ranger back-dates its endorsements as of the date of its
agents' requests.
With respect to the question of whether or not the Dyson
agency could have reasonably believed that AOA/Ranger wanted Dyson
to represent to its insurance customers the capability of providing
immediate coverage, Mr. Donald Dyson testified that since about
October 1970 when AOA/Ranger commenced acting upon his memo requests
in connection with the J. D. Air Service Account, that AOA/Ranger
had always issued endorsements to an existing policy effective as
of the date of request, if sufficient information was submitted to
rate the risk (R. 507-518, 525-528).

Similarly, Mrs. Mary Cartwr~gh

an underwriter in the Dyson agency, testified that to the oest of
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memory, AOA/Ranger had alwa?S back-dated endorsements to the

;;te of her request if all necessary information to rate the risk
;s submitted with the application for the endorsement during the
·dod she worked for the Dyson agency (R. 470).

Mrs. Cartwright

;rked for the Dyson agency from March 1970 to April 1977 (R. 474-475).
Such course of conduct was certainly the case with respect
:J the policy in question.

The addition of Stephen Kesler was first

:;c_uested by :-!rs. Cart,-rright in a telephone call to Mr. Brannon
.:AGA who relayed the cequest by telephone call to Mr. Dougherty
,: AOA, both of which •..;ere confirmed by r:1emos.

However, AOA requested

2:-tain pilot inforr:Jation •..;hich ·..;as subsequen::l:: fu::-:-:ishei a
:e:: the endorsement of Kesler \-Jas actually issued on September 17,

;75, it was back-dated effective as of July 22, 1975 as initially
.,,.Jested (Ex.

ll).

Hith respect to the adci::i::m of Tim Bissell,

:.e pilot experience for:!! was :on.;arded, after request by AOA, by
:,Jo dated

~ove:r.ber

13, 1975 and the endorsement when typed on

:cember 2, 1975, was back-dated effective :lover:1ber 13, 1975, the
::e the information •..;as for..;a:-ded b:1 ;:)yson (Ex.

14).

By the time

:the request to add Gar? Ferguson, :-!rs. Cartwright has secured a
lpply of the pilot experience forms and submitted one directly with
·e

~e~o

request to add Gary Fe:-guson on December 4, 19;5_

Without

.:-:her comr.runic-1tio:1, AOA issued the endorst:oent adding Ferguson on
'~er:Jbe:- 1').

..,

16).

1975, ~ack-daci:"lg it effective as of December 4, 1975

'..;i:::-: :-es~ec:: ::·o :':c:-'.::e::h 5:-:a:-::-:cr.,

::he :;:e~o application

.:~ pilot e:qerience for:-~ a::::ac~1ed •.-1as sent 'ov ~Irs.

Cartwright to
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AOA on December 8, 1975 only two days before the Ferguson application
was acted upon and back-dated by AOA.

Consi~ering

that the Ferguson

application would have been received back in the Dyson office shortly
after December 10, 1975 showing an effective date as of the date of
memo application of December 4, 1975, Mrs. Cartwright had every
reason to believe that the Shannon application of December 8, 1975
would be acted upon in due course in the same manner.
Knowing of the contention of Dyson that AOA/Ranger had
established a practice of back-dating requests for coverage effective
as of the date of the request and of the contention that AOA had
always accepted Dysons requests for coverage, AOA's Mr. Dougherty
had reviewed his agency's files with respect to policies written
through the Dyson agency and was able to offer in rebuttal to such
contentions only the example of an application for insurance coverage
which had been refused because the applicant who was in the business
of repairing and selling damaged aircraft wanted to insure such
aircraft while they were being flown in their damaged condition
to his location for repairs (R. 654).

Appellants contend that such

example is clearly distinquishable from the situation at bar
where the aircraft in question had already been accepted for coverage
and the matter at issue was merely the adding of additional pilots
to the policy as they qualified for coverage.
Also, the holding in Travelers that the expressed terms of
the agency agreement between the company

~nd ~gent

by subsequent conduct is in accord with Utah law.

couid be

~odified

As stated in

PLC Landscape Construction v. Picadilly Fish-'n Chips, Inc., 28
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Utah

~

350, 502 P.2d 562 (1972) this Court observed:

. . . there is nothing so sacrosanct about having
entered into one agreement that it will prevent
the parties entering into any such change, modification, extension or addition to their agreement
for doing business with each other that they may
mutually agree. That is what appears to have
happened here and such subsequent agreements are
governed by the same rules as to proof and
enforceability as the original agreement.
·:.is is true, even if the original agreement provided by its terms
::.at it could not be subsequently amended as stated in Davis v.
;vne and Dav, Inc., 10 Utah 2d 53, 348 P. 2d 337 (1960) and affirmed
.::Dillman v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 13 Utah 2d 142, 369 P.2d 296
j62):

It isawell-established rule of law that parties
to a written contract may modify, waive, or make
new te~s notwithstanding terms in the contract
designed to hamper such freedom.
Appellants respectfully submit that a:: elements that controlled
; Travelers are present in the instant case, except that in Travelers
~

course of conduct of back-dating policies alleged by the agent

:confer binding authority upon him was proven by some 300 examples
:back-dating, whereas in the instant case, the practice of back·'ting endorsements was admitted by AOA' s senior vice-president in

·arge of underr.rriting, as noted in the follo,ving point.
POINT II
AOA AND RA..\lGER ARE CONCLUSIVELY BOUND
BY THEIR ADHISSiml OF BACK-DATI~G
E~IDORSE;.!ENTS EFFECTIVE AS OF THE DATE
OF THE AGE~n' S REQUESTS FOR SUCH ENDORSE;.!E~TS PRIOR TO THE LOSS I~ QUESTION.
Since the commencec.ent o:

th~s

action, it has been Dyson's
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:sition that ADA/Ranger ef:ectivel•: granted the Dyson agency binding
-~~-

authority with respect to modifying existing policies by a course
of conduct of accepting Dyson's applications for endorsement ann
back-dating the endorsement effective as of the date of the Dyson
memo requesting the modification.

However, Dysons did not antici-

pate that AOA's witness, Tom Dougherty, Senior Vice-President in
charge of underwriting, would actually admit on cross-examination
that it was, without exception to the contrary [insofar as he was
able to document], the practice of AOA to back-date endorsements
to policies and all information necessary to rate the risk was
submitted with the application.

Some of Mr. Dougherty's testimony

on this point was as follows:

Q.

Let me back up. What I am asking is, you know of
no instance where the effective date of the
endorsement making the change or adding, whatever
was to be added, was not made effective as of the
date of request by the agent if that request
contained all of the information necessary by
the underwriting department to rate the risk?

A.

I will agree. (R. 612).

***
Q.

You heard Mr. Dyson's testimony on Tuesday, where
he stated that to his knowledge that was the
practice. That the effective date of the endorsement was always the date of the request when the
request contained all of the information, did you
not?

A.

I heard that.

Q.

And I suppose you went through your files insofar
as you could over the evening recess to determine
if he was wrong about that?

A.

Not ~s such, really to say - to agree, I would have
to d~sagree until we went through. I don't want
to agree to something like that on a carte blanche
basis.
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Q.

I understand you can't say there is a possibility
something is otherwise if yc.1 didn't look.
I ar:;
saying, from whatever looking you did do and from
whatever knowledge you presently have, you are
not presently aware of any instances that it was
different from what he said?

A.

T~at

is right, only what we have discussed.

The effect of such judicial admissions is as stated in
•~

C.J.S., Evidence, Section 381:
The cases abound with statements and holdings
that a judicial admission is generally conclusive on the party by whom it was made or to
whom it is attributable, if, as has been stated,
such judicial admission is made in the case on
trial, and if unequivocal, and unexplained or
uncontradicted, unless the court, in the exercise
of its discretion, expressly permits him to wi~~
draw his admission and relieves him from its
effect by reason of its having been made by
inadvertance or under a mistake of fact.

The Kansas Supreme Court has noted that a verdict cannot
::and even if there is evidence to support it, if the party in whose

:lvor it was rendered has made a judicial admission of facts which
luld not entitle him to the judgment.
.]2

In Hallett v. Stone, 534 P.2d

(Kan.l975) that Court stated:
This court has frequently recognized that admissions
made by a party are the strongest kind of evidence.
The proposition or law to be applied ~~der these
circumstances has been stated as follows:
a
verdict cannot be upset if there is any evidence
in the record to support it, where such issue is
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but such rule yields to the impact of admissions mdd~ by a party in his cescimony while
a witness in the case, and such admissions
are binding and conclusive upon him if uncontradicted or unexplained, whecher such
admissions are elicited on direct examinacion
or on cross-examination of the party. (Authority
cited).
Similarly, the Oregon Supreme Court in Gaswint v. Case, 509
P.2d 19 (Ore.l973) in an action for wrongful discharge during the
term of an employment contract, stated as follows:
In this case, however, plaintiff admitted on
cross-examination that only 50 percent of the
estimated sum of $1,500, or $750, was expended
in seeking other employment and this was binding
upon him as a judicial admission. It follows
that the trial court erred in its award to plaintiff of $1,115.37 as incidental damages to reimburse him for such expenses. It also follows
that any such award to plaintiff may not properly
exceed the sum of $750.
Likewise, this Court has held that a witness's testimony on direct
examination is no stronger than as it is left on cross-examination.
Alvarado v. Tucker, 2 Utah 2d 16, 268 P.2d 986 (1954).
The trial court erred in not applying the foregoing rule
to the testimony of Mr. Dougherty since there was no reason to
invoke the "interests of justice" exception.

To the contrary, the

interests of justice required that the rule be invoked to prevent
the unjust enrichment that inures to an insruance company when it
back-dates policies and endorsements to the date of the application therefor and charges and collects a prenium from that date \.Jhen
no loss has occurred, but then would repudiate che practice •..;hen a
loss has occurred.

There is no question but that if an endorse~ent

involved an additional premium, it would be charged from the effectiVE
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It appears from the record that the trial court misconstrued
:~e

prerequisites to an implied agreement based on the conduct of

:)e parties to require the affirmative consent of both parties to
:~e

implied agreement.

During the testimony of Mr. Dougherty, the

:ourt itself inquired as to the procedure which resulted in the

:ack-dating practice in the following coloquy:
THE COURT:

What would the underwriter do physicallly
to that application to indicate that the
endorsement requested was approved:

THE WITNESS:

Generally they will just initial it as
approved and get it--route it to the policy
'Nriting department.

THE COURT:

And do you indicate the date on which it
is approved?

THE HITXESS:

No, I think that is probably why a lot of
these endorsements have the date of the
agent's memo.
The policy 'Nriting department knows we have approved them and if
it is not specific, you know, as to what
the effective date is, they are picking
up the date of the memo.
That is the
mechanics of it.

THE COURT:

Yet as I understand it, it isn't until you
approve it that vou figure the pilot is
included in the policv; is that correct?

THE WIT:-1ESS:

Yes, sir.

(R. 680).

'.~d. in the Court Memorandum ::lecision,

it makes the observation:

Broughton's note to Dyson, the receipt of which
was denied, does not support an implication that
as of that date Ranger was bound on Shannon and
so understood it.
(R. 263).
The doctrlne of implied agreement based on a course of conduct
~uld be meaningless if the parties had to affirmatively acknowledge

re :1at

the implied agreement r.vas intended.

Under such circumstances,
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Also, the trial court ignored the legal effect of Hr. Dyson's
admission that back-dating of endorsements to the date of request
by the agent was binding upon AOA/Ranger and did not require further
proof of such course of conduct by Dyson.

In its Hemorandum Decisior.,

the Court stated:
. . . I have considered the testimony with respect
to these other policies and do not find the facts
support counsel's contention that a course of dealing was established from which it can be found that
coverage was binding upon submission of the pilot
information and request for the change.
(R. 261).
The Court goes on to state that there were sufficient variations in
the other policies to preclude such a finding.

Even accepting such

a finding on the evidence as we are required to do on appeallant
review, does not vitiate the uncontroverted admission of l1r. Doughern
that it was in fact the practice of AOA/Ranger to back-date endorsements effective as of the date of request by the agent if the
request contained all of the information necessary to rate the
risk and no other date was requested, or obviously indicated such
as adding a new plane effective as of the date of purchase or

rene••i~g

a policy effective as of the anniversary date of the policy.

These

were the types of situations found in some of the other policies
which the trial court was referring to in its Hemorandum Decision.
Appellants challenge repondents to support the trial court's
finding by showing in the record one single occasion when AOA/Ranger
did not back-date an endorsement to add a p.:.lot. co an exist1.ng poi.ic:·
effective as of the date of the agent's request when all info~a
tion necessary to rate the risk was submitted with the request for
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The reason give by Mr. Dougherty for the back-dating of
ch endorsements was as follows:

1

Q.

In response to my question, if you don't assume
the pilot is flying the airplane until he gets
your written endorsement, what is the purpose
of pre-dating the effective date of the endorsement?

A.

Well, really I could only repeat my last answer.
We are looking for the best possible effective
date for everyone involved. Quite often the
person typing the endorsement wouldn't know
exactly r..ffiat date I approved it.
(R. 660).

:nrently, however, this reason of "the best possible effective

l:;:e for everyone involved" did not apply if a loss occurred bel::;een the request for the endorsement and the issuance of ::--..E::
.:me.

Even if the trial court was not satisifed with the weight
~d

effect of appellant's evidence submitted in their case in chief,

:cannot disregard the admissions of respondent's chief witness
:;de in the course of his cross-exar.-tination.
j~contraverted

Especially when it

that the last action taken by AOA/Ranger on the

:::icy in question prior to the loss conformed ,.;ith Mr. Dougherty's
:~ission,

i.e., without telephone binder of any kind, Mrs. Cartwright

ont a memo dated December 4, 1975 r..;ith pilot experience form
::ached requesting the addition of Gary Ferguson as a covered
:lot On the policy in question and '.Vithout further COllllllunication
~my kind, AOA/Ranger issued such endorsement adding Ferguson as

: ~ilot on t\'te policl ov an endorsemenc tvped December 10, 1975,
lc back-dated effecti·Je as of Dece::!'lber 4, 1975, the date of Mrs.

·l::t'.vright'
s :nemo
req~.eesti::1g
the forendorsement.
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However, ignoring Hr. Dougherty's admission and the
acknowledged handling of the Ferguson endorsement, the trial court
summarily found in its Memorandum Decision that:
From the foregoing facts it is thus apparent that
no written endorsement approving the addition of
the name of Shannon as a pilot to Item 7 of the
policy was ever issued. (R. 260).
The question is not whether an endorsement adding Shannon was in
fact issued, but rather, whether such an endorsement should have
been issued considering the admitted practice of AOA/Ranger and its
prior conduct with respect to the policy in question and who held
the interim risk of loss while the request for the endorsement was
being processed by AOA/Ranger.
AOA and Ranger seek to avoid the interim risk of loss while
the request for the addition of Shannon [an admittedly acceptable
pilot] (R. 600) was being procecced in their offices on the ground
that they had not received a response to Sara Broughton's memo of
December 15.

Such a position cannot be sustained for the reasons

set forth in the following point.
POINT III
AOA VIOLATED ITS DUTY TO ACT UPON
DYSONS' REQUEST TO ADD KENNETH
SHANNON AS A PILOT.
As a general rule of law, an insurance agent has a dut;T to
promptly and competently act upon a request for the placement of
insurance coverage.

As stated in 43

~.J~r.2~,

As ~general rule, a broker or agent who, with
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unjustifiably and through his fault or neglect,
fails to do sc, ~ill be held liable for anv
damage resulting thereform.
The agent or ~
broker is liable on the theory that he is the
agent of the insured in negotiating for a
policy and that he owes a duty to his principal to exercise reasonable skill, care, and
diligence in effecting the insurance.
He may
be sued for breach of contract or negligent
default in the performance of a duty imposed
by contract, at the election of his client.

In Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc., et al. v. Lea, et al., 401
1
· 2d 650 (3rd Cir. 1968) the Court held that an insurance broker
::st follow the instructions of its customer or be liable for damages
:osulting from his failure to do so in the following language:
If a ~roker or agent of the insured neg~ects c~
procure insurance, or does not follow instructions,
or if the policv is void or materiallv defective, throu:o;h t::-~c agent's fault, he is. liable to
his principal for any loss he may have sustained
thereby.
. It is generally considered that
if the neglect or breach of dutv of s~ch broker
results in loss to his principal. the broker
is liable to the same extent as the insurer
would have been liable had the insurance been
properly effected, and must pay the resulting
loss.
(Emphasis added).
~:ilarl:r.

in Brm-m v. Coolev, 247 P.2d 868

C:~.N.l952)

the Court staced:

Under t!"le facts and circ'-l!:lstances in this case
it is the deterninaticn of this court that
Paul S Brm-m Has the agent of the appellee
that he failed to perform r...-ith reasonable
dili ence the instructions received trom his
principa . that the appellee su tere
amages
proximating resulting fro~ that neglect, and:
that the appellant is liable therefor.
(Emphasis
added).
In Tal~ot v
.:

1

.

.l.pp 19~3)

Countr~ ~ife

Insurance Comoanv.

291 ~E2d 830

the Court held that an a:.legation that five months

-~sed between the app:ication

for ~ire insurance and an uninsured
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fire loss stated a cause of action; and in Brand v. International
Investors Insurance Company, 521 P.2d 423 (Okla.l974) a three week
delay between an application for life insurance and the death of
the applicant without a policy having been issued constituted a
jury question as to the negligence of the agent.
In the case at bar, Mrs. Cartwright made an unqualified
request that Kenneth Shannon be added as a covered pilot in the
following language:
We enclose a pilot experience form completed
by Kenneth Richard Shannon who is to be
included as a pilot under the above captioned
policy. We would appreciate your endorsement
to this effect. Thanks.
(Ex. 17) .
It should be noted that the language of the memo does not
condition the request by providing that the premium must remain
the same or be increased only so much.

The contention of AOA that

it had to wait for confirmation of a premium increase of $100.00
per year on a policy which already carried a premium of $1050.00
(Ex. 5 and R. 631) is absurd and contrary to the evidence.
The policy premium was increased $302.00 when the policy
was changed to "limited commercial" and AOA admittedly did not knOii
if that increase was approved by Dysons before the endorsement was
issued, since it had dealt only with AGA (R. 716).

Also, AOA kneli

that the addtional $100.00 premium would be charged to the Dyson
agency account (R. 720) and, therefore, the agency would be ultima:
responsible to pay the premic:r:l,

,..._

...., ....

...... ,.. ...
~ ~.......

.....

o-1-.,..

'- .... c.

additional premium to the Dyson agency.
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For AOA to contend that it had to "have an understanding
:are going to pay (be paid] for what we do" (r. 716) before it
~lt

secure enough to act upon the unqualified instruction to add

, ::.annan as a pilot which would increase the premium $100.00 per year,
.:.en it had been doing business with the Dyson agency since February

_j68 (Ex. 2) stretches one's imagination and smacks of afterthought.
Appellants suggest that considering the duty of an insur'~ce

broker to timely and competently act upon unqualified instruction

::?rocure insurance as noted in the cases referred to above, that
.: t!'lat broker (AOA) deems that it needs further confirmation to
.::rease the policy premium by $100.00 per year, that t::te r:o:s?on:)ility for follow-up regarding that confir.nation should rest with

:.t

The record is undisputed that Sara Broughton did nothing to

i :::ow-up on the request for coverage of Shar.nor: as a pilot after

::egedly sending a reply memo to confirm the additional $100.00
1

o: ?ear premium.
As hereinafter discussed,

I

the record will not support

~he

-:S'J.l:Jption that the Dyson agency received the Sara Broughton reply

J~~

and, therefore,

legally t::te burden could not be upon the Dyson

-;mc:r to respond to it.

Poi:n

IV

I:1 THE ABSE~lCE OF TESTI:!O~Y 7HAT
THE SA~ BROCGH:'O(l ~!EHO :.JAS DEPOSITED
l)l .::.. c:;-::::::::; STA7ES :-!AiL. D:C:?OS :CTORY,
THERE IS 'lO PRESU':'PTION 'I'I-LU I'I' ~lAS
RECEIVED 3Y :'HE DYSON AGE~KY.
Respondents AOA.'~an;er ~n:roduced the testimony of Sara
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of the mailing of her memo of December 15, 1975, she stated:

Q.

What did you do after you

A.

I mailed it back to the agent.

Q.

The agent being Dyson?

A.

And Associates.

Q.

And Associates?

A.

Yes sir.

~ad

written the memo?

(R. 739-740).

Respondents never laid a factual foundation as to how the
mailing was accomplished and, consequently, Miss Broughton's testiiJc::
is nothing more than a conclusionary statement that she "mailed it "
Her supervisor, Mr. Dougherty, testified regarding the mailing situa·
tion as follows:

Q.

And then I suppose mail that goes out from the
underwriting department is then turned over to
the mail room people and they mail it out?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Sara Broughton would not be an individual who
would actually put the mail in a U.S. Hail
receptacle, is she?

A.

No.

(R. 608-609).

In view of Mr. Dougherty's testimony, the trial court was obligated
to accept the fact that Miss Broughton did not place the reply memo
in question in a U.S. Mail depository and there was no evidence free
anyone who might have done so.

Therefore, the record is devoid

any evidence upon which it can be found that a memo was in fact
mailed back to the Dyson agency through tte United States mails.

.I

]
In a somewhat similar case, Coffey v. Polimeni, 188 F.2d5:!
(9th
Cir.l951), an insurance agent apparently misplaced a client's
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I

_:tter requesting insurance coverage and giving the necessary inforI

:at ion to secure the same and wrote a letter to the customer readising the customer of the required information.

A fire occurred

i:efore insurance coverage was effected and the jury trying the case
':cund in favor of the customer and against the insurance agent.

The

::neth Circuit affirmed the finding and noted with respect to
::a:ling facts very similar to those in the instant case:
i

.
.the record fails to indicate with any
degree of clarity whether this letter of
June 4 actually reached Polimeni.
A copy
of it was attached to Coffey's answer in
the case and on the trial a carbon copy
was introduced along with the remaining
correspondence.
. The burden of proof
on this issue [mailing] was concededly on
the defendant, [insurance agent] where ~he
court placed it.

I :;arding the agent's obligation to act upon the request for insur,ce, the court stated:
1

Counsel argued that, assuming negligence,
the correct rule is that no action will lie
against an insurance agent for delay in
acting on an application where no breach
of legal duty to obtain insurance appears.
They concede tha~ this view is at variance
with the general trend of authority and with
the great bulk of the decisions dealing
immediately with the subject.
A few commentators and an occasional judge have criticized
this line of decisions as unorthodox or
unsupported by reason, but they appear to us
to announce a salutorv rule.
The thought
they stand for is that the agent or company owes
the applicant for insurance what amounts to
a legal obligation to act with reasonable
promrt~ess o~ his 2pplication, either by
providing a desired coverage or by notifying
the applicant of the rejection of the risk so
that he may not be lulled into a feeling of
security or put to prejudicial delay in seeking
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protection elsewhere. Implicit in the case
is Q ~ecognitior- thac these transactions are
fundamentally unlike ordinary commercial or
business dealings where a mere profit is the
stake, so prone is the failure of insurance
protection to result in irretrievable disaster
to the individual. Those engaged in the insurance business understand perfectly the particular
urgency of the need for prompt attention in
these matters.
In a recent Eighth Circuit case, Leasing Associates, Inc.
v. Slaughter & Son, Inc., et al., 450 F.2d 174 (8th Cir.l97l), the
majority and minority rules regarding mailing were discussed and
according to that Court's interpretation of the rules, the evidence
submitted in the instant case would not support a finding of
under either rule.

"maili~.;

In that case, the testimony regarding mailing

was as follows:

Q.

You assumed, then, that it went out?

A.

Yes, I assumed that it went out . . . I cannot prove
it ever got inside the mail box. All I can say is
it went out of our office in the normal course of
business.

Q.

You assumed that it did?

A.

That's right.

Q.

You don't know whether it ever got past your
secretary's desk, do you?

A.

Yes, it came for my signature, I put it in
my out box for the mail clerk to pick up and
mail.

The Circuit Court conceded that the question of mailing would be
determined by Arkansas law, but could find "'C' _"..r!<a::sas ac;::~1or::_:::y
directly on the question and, therefore, discussed the majoritv
and minority rules as follows:
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There the evidentiary problem was whether
defend~nt's ~es~i~ony that she personally
mailed a particular letter was sufficiently
precise to '"arrant a presumption that the
letter was received.
Of importance here is
the fact that the tenor of the Arkansas Court's
approach to the problem was cautiously to
require clear proof of all the facets of a
proper mailing, i.e., proper stamping, addressing and posting.
Moreover, the Arkansas
Court's view of this type of evidence is
clearly matched by its zealous protection of
the debtor under Ark. Stat. §85-9-504(3) in
Barker & Norton, supra.
\.Je therefore are
constrained to approach this question with
the narrow view of Dengler, that "technicalities that make for justice may not be casually
disregarded." 120 S. W. 2d at 354.
As shown by Annotations 25 A.L.K. 9, 13. suD~ 1 e
l:lented at 85 A.L.R. 541, 544 and 3G Am.Jur2d
Evidence §1119, the weight of authori:y holds
the evidence here presented to be insufficient
due to the failure to call the mail clerk to
verify either that he mailed this particular
letter or at least that it was his. custom to
mail such letters.
Thus if Arkansas were to
adopt the "majority rule," reversal would
here be reauired . . . . However, even if
Arkansas law were in accord ,,.,ith the "minoritv,"
a jury finding that clerical personnal performed
their duties in properly posting the mail would
be permissible only if there were clear testimony
by the executive as to the customary practice in
his office and his actions in compliance therewith.
The problel:l in this case, however, is that plaintiff's sole witness on this point, Dillinger,
proffered no description of the o::ice practice
from ',.,rhich a j ur:r could properly determine
whether his actions were in accord ~ith it.
He gave no indication as to who customarily
did the basic acts as addressing, sealing and
stamping the envelooes and whether he could
verifv that he and his secretarv had done such
of th;se as was ~heir customarv· dutv before he
s~gned the letter and placed it in the tray ~~
~~s d2sk.
~~3 cc~cl~s~o~Jr~ statemen~ that
~t
went out in the nor~al cour~e of business in
my office as all :nail. does each dav" is simply
not enough.
"T'l.e essential elernentarv facts
mav be shown b:' course
'::Jusiness properly
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of Des Moines,
OS Iowa 7 2, 21 N.VJ 580, 53 1923,. Hl:E:::
plaintiff may "show the essential facts constituting transmission by mail by showing th~
course of business, it failed because there Ls
no evidence in the record as to what this office
routine may have been." Forrest v. Soverei~ Camp,
W.O.W. 220 Iowa 478, 261 N.W. 802, 804 (1935 .
"That may be rather technical but the appellee
relies on a presumption which does not arise,
unless the evidence itself discloses" the
basic facts underlying it. Deniger v. Deniger,
120 S.W.2d at 343.
Accordingly, whichever view Arkansas might be
deemed to follow, we are constrained to hold
that the evidence is not adequate to support
the requisite jury finding that notification
was placed in the United States mail.
Similarly, in the instant case, no evidence was offered unde:
even the "minority" business routine rule as to who stamped, addresst
posted or deposited mail of the type in question, and no evidence
was offered that those who customarily perform such duties did in
fact perform them during the time period in question.
The trial court seemed to acknowledge the lack of proof of
mailing in this regard by alleviating counsel's request to voir
dire by statine:
I would say this, the acceptance of the exhibit,
[AOA's file copy] I would not interprete it as
saying as proof you received it.
(R. 632).
Such being the case, AOA had a duty to process the instruction to
add Shannon as a pilot without further confirmation, and not having
done so is liable to Dysons for any liability they have incurred
as a result of AOA's failure to so act.

-34-
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POINT V
AOA AND RA...'lGER WRONGFULLY DENIED
COVERAGE FOR THE LOSS IN QUESTION.
On the day after the loss in question, Mrs. Cartwright of
':1e Dyson agency filed a First Notice of Claim (Ex. 18); and on
'arch 31, 1976, the insured, Donald A. Dyson, filed a Proof of Loss
~-:fidavit

(Ex.

37).

Respondents have not contended that Mr. Dyson

.as not complied with the policy's applicable notice of loss require-

:ents.

However, :1r. Thomas W. Lehman, one of AOA' s claims examiners

' 603), advised the insured, Donald A. Dyson, by letter of March
.J,

1976 (Ex.

1,:Iecuted,

38), one day before the P-::-oof of Loss A:":-:..:'i'Tit was

that !-lis claim \vas denied for the reason that:
:1r. Shannon was not a named oilot unde-::- the
terms of the policy nor did he qualify under
the open pilot endorsement.
Adcitionally,
you warranted in the application :"or aircraft
insurance that vou were the sole O'Nll.er of the
aircraft.
The records of the FAA and our
further investigation indicates this information was incorrect.

At the time of the loss, AOA's underwriting depart;::ent and
~:es •..;ere in Dallas and the claims depart:cJent was still in Beaumont

11 603).

Mr. Dougherty's first notice of the loss was a request

·:1m the claims depart!:lent

-ce (R. 603).
il-603-604) and,

for a coc:1plete copy of the undenv--riting

He was ne'1er intervie·..:ed by the claims department
therefore, the claims examiner, ~!r. Tom Lehman,

I

··c denied the loss could not have knovm about the underr..rriting

''art;r,erlt' s aJ.mitceJ pra.ctice o:" back-dating endorsements to the
':e of req'--lest,

if the re1uest crcnC:Jined all information necessary

-rate the
risk_
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Mr. Lehman apparently went through the underwriting file
and together with such other information as was available to him,
determined the most plausible reasons for denying the loss--the
fact that Mr. Shannon had not as yet been endorsed on the policy,
giving no thought as to whether or not under AOA 1 s admitted
practices and prior conduct on the policy Shannon should have been
endorsed on the policy or who held the interim risk while the
request for endorsement was being processed.

In that regard, it

is interesting to note that even the claims department did not deem
a lack of response to Sara Broughton 1 s memo of December 15 request:.n;
confirmation of an additional $100.00 per year premium charge as
a good reason for denying the loss in its formal letter denying
the claim (Ex. 38).
Also, it should be noted that there is no contention that

Mr. Shannon did not have the experience qualifications to be covered
as a named pilot.

That determination already had been made as is

obvious from the fact that Sara Broughton 1 s alleged memo acknowledgec
that he could be added for another $100.00 per year premium charge.
The reasons given for the denial of coverage are (1) that
Shannon had not been endorsed as a named pilot and (2) that Mr. Dyso~.
had warranted in his application for the aircraft insurnace that he
was the sole owner of the aircraft.

As mentioned, ~r. Lehman did

not even consider whether Shannon should have been so endorsed, or
who held the interim risk:.

-36-
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The second reason advanced by Hr. Lehman for declining
::verage is totally inaccurate.

Hr. Lehman states:

Additionally, you warranted in the application
for aircraft insurance that you were the sole
owner of the aircraft.
(Ex. 38).
:.1

examination of the Application for Aircraft Insurance (Ex. 4)

:~11

reveal no item number even requesting ownership information.

:: is true that the policy (Ex.
:~on

3) states in item 8 of the declara-

that the named insured is the sole owner unless otherwise

.)cicated.

Hm.;ever, the declaration sheet of the policy is prepared

;: the offices of AOA and is signed by Thomas Dougherty on behalf of
:.JA, not by Hr.
~

Dyson.

The most that can be said against Mr. Dyson

that if upon receiving the policy he happened to note and to read

:cat particular line item of the policv (of which there is no
~idence)

that he failed to call to the attention of AOA that there

ere other owners of the aircraft.

On the other hand, it is obvious

:~at

AOA' s underwriting department made such entry on the policy

=~th

no application information to support it.

The general law

:egarding an inaccuracy in an application for insurance. even when
::is the fault of the insured, is as indicated in Couch on Insur;~c e

2d , § 3 8 : 6 8 , p . 3 8 2 :
It is well settled, whether the risk is that
of life, accident, or fire, that where an application for insurance is Qade in •Nriting, and the
questions therein as to material facts are
unanswered or incompletely answered, and the
insurer, without further inquiry, issues the
policv, it thereby waives all right to a
disclosure, or to a more complete answer with
respect to the fact to which the unanswered
question or incompletely answered question
relates, and the policy cannot thereafter, in
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-

the absence of clear proof of a fraudulent
or !.ntentiunal supp.Ct2S::,.i..uu u[ Ch€. f3.C~,
be avoided on the ground of concealment or
of incomplete answers.
In support of this rule, the text cites approxiraately 80 cases frow

35 jurisdictions.

The text further states at §37:555, p. 164:

Although knowledge of the insured's breach of
the ownership clause is ordinarily essential
to effect a waiver or an estoppel, the insurer
cannot assert its lack of knowledge of the breach
when it is the insurer's own fault that it was not
informed. That is, where the insurer fails to
inquire of the insured it is generally deemed
charged with knowledge of the facts as to which
it did not inquire, even though the ownership
clause is a requirement of the standard policy.
So it is declared that when an insurance company
insures property without inquiring into the state
of title to such property before issuing the
policy, it waives the ownership clause, and the
policy is valid, provided the insured has sufficient title or interest to sustain the contract
of insurance.
(Emphasis added).
In the instant case, since the application form used by
AOA did not request ownership information, it must be held to
have waived such information.

Donald A. Dyson was a one-fifth (1/5)

owner of the aircraft and had sufficient ownership interest in the
aircraft to sustain a contract of insurance.

Under such arrangement.

he would hold in trust four-fifths (4/5) of any proceeds recovered
under the insurance policy for the benefit of the other joint owners
Further, Mr. Dougherty acknowledged that the existence of
additional owners who were not yet flying the aircraft •would not
increase the underwriting risk or the policy premium (R. 657)

:~e

company, of course, would know when such owners became pi.lots beca'J 5'
they would have to be endorsed as named pilots on the polic7 and ~~
company
then
adjust
premium
ifthe it
deemed
itLibrary
aoprcpriate
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It is clear that ADA/Ranger suffered no prejudice in not
~~g

awar= that there were uther owners of che aircraft at the

::::1e the policy 1vas issued, and since the reason they did not know
~s

because they did not ask for such information in their standard

;~plication

form, the fact that the application did not reveal such

~Jformation

cannot justly be used as a reason for denying coverage

::the loss in question.
POHTT IJI

THE TRIAL COCRT ERRED IN DENYING
APPELL&~TS' RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY.
This case was originally set for trial on
:977.

On \.Jednesday,

~cnday,

September

September 14, appellants personaL:· served

:Junsel for t!le other parties '.Vith copies of a demand for jury
::~al

and fEed the original '.vit!l the Clerk of Court on Thursday,

::Jtember 15.
~=adings

On Thursda:; and Friday, the ot:O.e:::-

moved to strike t!le demand.

?~rties

by various

Judge Croft, to whom the

:;se was assigned, wit!:out hearing, granted said motions and struck
:JPellants' demand for jury trial on Friday, September 16 by a
:::e?hone cal: to appellants' counsel's office.
Admittedly,
~ch

the demand for jury trial did not fully comply

Rule 5.:2 of the Rules of Practice in t!le Dis::rict Courts of

".eState of Utah ·.vhich pro·.rices t!lat a demand for jury trial shall
'Jade ten (lQ) days ?rio::- to t:::-ial, but the demand ~as served and
::cd sufficientlv in acivar.ce c: t:Ce trial date to provide opposing
runsel adequate time to

their requests for instructions and
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to permit the Clerk's office to call a jury in its regular course
of handling such matters.

Counsel had three (3) weekdays prior to

the date of trial in which to prepare requests and the Clerk's office
had two (2) weekdays in which to call a jury.

The Clerk's office

rountinely does not call a jury for a Monday trial until late Friday
afternoon when it has been determined that there will be a Judge
available the following Monday to try the case.
This Court has long since held that opposing parties have no
standing to contest a parties' application for a jury trial, althougr.
such application is not made in the precise manner and at the precise
time prescribed by rule or statute.

Davis v. Denver and Rio Grande

Railroad Company, 45 Utah 1, 142 Pac. 705 (1914).

The granting or

denying of an application for jury trial not made strickly in accord
with rules of Court is, concedely, a matter of discretion.

Hunter

v. Michaelis, 114 Utah 242,198 P.2d 245 (1948);Webb v. Hebb, 116
Utah 155, 209 P.2d 201 (1949).
However, appellants contend that the denial of a demand for
jury trial which is made sufficiently in advance of trial so as to not
prejudice the opposing parties or inconvenience the normal operation
of the Clerk's office is an abuse of such discretion, since there

'..laS:

no real reason to deny such a very basic and substantial rigLt of a
party in the American system of jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION
The salient facts in this case are unciisputed in the record.
i.e., that AOA/Ranger had succumbed to the practice, intentional or
unintentional, of back-dating requests for endorsements adding namec
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:equest therefor, if the request contained all information necessary
:orate the risk; and AOA had so treated the request [Ferguson) most
:ecent to the request in question [Shannon] on the Dyson policy.
cJCJ a practice is legally tantamount to extending binding authority

:o the writing agent, since to hold otherwise gives the insurance
:Jmpany the unfair advantage of requiring the insured to hold the
:isk of loss •.-Jhile the request for endorsement is being processed

·"the company's offices, but allowing it to charge the insured for
::te endorsement from the date of the request if the same is accepted,
ien no loss has occurred and, consequently, the company knows that
·.:.ere has been no risk incurred during the time beto.veen ':!"-.e agent's
~~est

for the endorsement and the date of its issuance.
The evidence of such conduct was the testimony of AOA's

:nior Vice-President in charge of undenrc-iting on cross-exaoination
·.d such evidence is conclusive on that issue and the trial court
~ed

in finding that appellants had not proved such a course of

1t-::1duct.

Procedurally, it is not necessary to prove what is admitted.
There was a legal duty imposed upon AOA/Ranger to promptly

; .;d competently process the request for endorsement of Shannon as
1~ed

pilot to the policy in question.

That duty was not legally

o:minated by the mailing of a request to confirm the additional

.:o. 00

per year premium to be charged for the endorsement when there

'' insufficient evidence ;:>roferred at trial to raise a presumption
• mailing
Therefore, AOA-'Ranger

·.vron~fully

and unjustlv denied coverage
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pilot under the terms of the policy," which begs the real issue
of whether or not AOA's back-dating practice constituted implied
binding authority on the part of the writing agency and required
AOA/Ranger to hold the risk of loss during the time the request
for endorsement was being processed.

The further reason given

for denial of coverage--that Dyson had "warranted in the application
for aircraft insurance that you were the sole owner of the aircraft"
and that such representation was untrue was without merit since the
application signed by Dyson did not give any information regarding
ownership.

The application form was one supplied by AOA and since

it did not request such information, AOA must be deemed to have
waived it and cannot now be permitted to use the absence of such
information as a justifiable basis for denial of the loss in
question.
Since the Dyson agency properly submitted a request for the
endorsement of Shannon as a named pilot, including his pilot

experie~:e

form, to AOA, under AOA's admitted practice of back-dating such
endorsements it should be held that AOA held the risk of loss while
the request for the Shannon endorsement was being processed in AOA's
office, and the Court erred in finding that Dyson was not entitled
to recover the amount of the policy coverage from Ranger Insurance
Company and in its finding that Dysons had not fulfilled their duties
to the other plaintiff Owners.

If AOA/Ranger had promptly processec

the request for the Shannon endorsement, the O'ATners would 110~" bc;ve
suffered the loss in question.

The loss sustained was due to AOA's
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~glect,

not that of Dysons'.

However, even if it is held that the

)ysons are technically liable to the plaintiff Owners since the
:Jannon endorsement was in fact not issued prior to the time of the
~oss

in question, then the trial court erred in not granting Dysons

~udgment

over against AOA/Ranger for the latter's failure to promptly

::-ocess the request for the endorsement and in failing to find that
IDA/Ranger held the risk of loss during the time such request was
)eing processed.
Further the trial court erred and abused its discretion in
:e:1?ing Dysons' demand for trial by jury since the same '.vas served
~d

filed sufficiently in advance of the trial date to

c~use

no

::ejudice to the opposing parties nor interference with the Clerk's
I

:;untine in processing requests for jury trial.
\'~REFORE,

I

appellants pray that this Honorable Court reverse

:'.e judgment of the trial court by directi:1g that judgment be entered

.: ::.favor of Donald A. Dyson against AOA/Ranger on plaintiffs' Complain,
::that judgment be entered in favor of Donald A. Dyson and L. F.
~son

& Associates on their Counterclaim against AOA/Ranger in the

'.:aunt of any j·Jdg:nent found in favor of the Owners against the
.::sons.
Alternatively, appellants pray that the action be remanded
:, the Third Judicial Discrict Court i:-1 and for Salt Lake County for
::~al by jur:1 Dursuant to aopel:.an':s'

demand therefor prior to the
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Respectfully submitted this

day of July, 1978.

H. WAYNE I.JADSWORTH
of and for
WATKISS & Cill~BELL
310 South Main, 12th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Appellants Donald
A. Dyson and L. F. Dyson &
Associates, Inc.

WALLACE R. LAUCmWR
of and for
BAYLE & LAUCHNOR
200 South Main, #1105
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Appellant Donald
A. Dyson
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed, postage prepaid, two copies
Jf the foregoing Appellants' Brief to each counsel for the parties
as

designated below on the

day of July, 1978.

RA~OND A. HINTZE
WALKER & HINTZE
4685 Highland Drive, #202
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Attornevs for Respondents Stephen
F. Kesler, W. T. Bissell, Ronald
~cClain, Donald L. Oborn and Elmo Walker

R. CLARK A.'R.."iOLD
REYNOLDS & -~~OLD
922 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Respondent Garv Ferguson
STUA.~T L. POEL~~
S~WW, CHRISTENSEN

& l·lARTINEAU
200 South Main, #700
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84101
Attornevs for Res::>ondents Aviation
Otfice of America, Inc. and Ranger
Insurance Comoanv

H. ~~AYNE WADSHORTH
Of Appellants' Attorneys
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